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DODD–FRANK’S PROTECTIONS FOR SENIOR CITIZENS: AN
IMPORTANT, YET INSUFFICIENT STEP
Julie Goldsmith Reiser* & Michael B. Eisenkraft**

President Obama signed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Protection Act1 (Dodd–Frank or the Act) into law on July 21, 2010.
Dodd–Frank, the full title of which is, “An Act [t]o promote the
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect
the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from
abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes,” is 848
pages long and filled with numerous important regulations for
America’s financial system—many of which have attracted widespread
notice and debate in popular media. For instance, according to
Wikipedia:
In addition to the headline regulatory changes covering capital investment
by banks and insurance companies, the Act introduces new regulation of
hedge funds and private equity funds, alters the definition of accredited
investors, requires reporting by all public companies on CEO to median
employee pay ratios and other compensation data, enforces equitable
access to credit for consumers, and provides incentives to promote
banking among low- and medium-income residents.2

This Article is about none of these important and prominent
provisions of Dodd–Frank. Instead, it is about one of the “other
purposes,” referenced in the full title of Dodd–Frank—a few provisions
buried amongst Dodd–Frank’s 848 pages that touch ever so lightly on an
issue that seems at first glance both noncontroversial and modest in
comparison to the more publicized problems tackled by Dodd–Frank,
but in fact represents one of the most important and potentially thorny
issues facing the American economy: how to protect the financial assets
* Julie Goldsmith Reiser is a partner in the Securities Fraud/Investor Protection practice group
in the Washington, D.C. office of Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC. Ms. Reiser focuses much of her
practice on enforcement of the federal securities laws on behalf of sophisticated domestic and
international institutional investors.
** Michael Eisenkraft is a partner in the Securities Fraud/Investor Protection and Small
Business practice groups in the New York office of Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC. Mr.
Eisenkraft focuses much of his practice on the representation of plaintiffs in securities class actions and
other complex commercial litigation.
1. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
2. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, WIKIPEDIA (June 22, 2012,
11:19 AM), http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Dodd%E2%80%93Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_and_
Consumer_Protection_Act&oldid=498816065 (accessed from Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act page by clicking “View history” tab near search bar then clicking on the June 22, 2012, 11:19
version).
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of senior citizens from the potentially deleterious effects of age and
those who would take advantage of their condition.
Specifically, this Article describes the shape and scope of the problem
that inspired the elder protection portions of the legislation, details what
Dodd–Frank did to protect the elderly from financial peril, analyzes the
weaknesses of the steps Congress has taken, examines the potential
pitfalls to be aware of when developing protections for seniors, and
advocates for three additional steps that should be taken to adequately
combat this problem.
Specifically, in order to effectively tackle the problem of elderly
financial abuse, a problem of large and rapidly increasing scope, the
following policies should be put into place: (1) bank officials, health
professionals, brokers, and insurance agents should all become
mandatory reporters of elder financial abuse—a step that would bring
thousands of trained eyes to bear on a problem which has grown large
and monstrous in the shadows; (2) brokers and insurance agents should
owe a fiduciary duty to their customers, making them responsible for
recommending products that will benefit their customers, not just their
employers; and (3) there should be a license required to sell financial
products to senior citizens which would require a short course on the
special needs of the elderly and a criminal background check.
I. FINANCIAL FRAUD AND THE ABUSE OF SENIORS: THE ORIGINS OF
DODD–FRANK’S SENIOR-SPECIFIC PROTECTIONS
Most of the senior-specific provisions of Dodd–Frank did not
originate with Senator Dodd, Congressman Frank, or the finance
committees.3 Instead, these provisions originated in the Senior
Investment Protection Act of 2008,4 a bill proposed by Senator Herb
Kohl (D-WI) in his role as Chairman of the U.S. Senate Special
Committee on Aging.5 This bill stemmed from a hearing held in
September 2007 by the Senate’s Special Committee on Aging.6
Eventually Senator Kohl, who was also a member of the Senate Finance
Committee, got some of the provisions of the Senior Investment
Protection Act enacted into law as part of Dodd–Frank. While it is
difficult or even impossible to know what exactly motivated Senator
Kohl, the Senate, or the House to include these specific provisions in

3. Telephone Interview with Ken Willis, Commc’ns Dir., Senate Special Comm. on Aging
(Apr. 20, 2012).
4. Senior Investment Protection Act of 2008, S. 2794 (2008).
5. Telephone Interview with Ken Willis, supra note 3.
6. Id.
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Dodd–Frank or even to advocate for their passage,7 the testimony given
at the September 2007 hearing held by the U.S. Senate Committee on
Aging provides a very good clue. Published discussions and analyses of
the problem offer further clues.
A. The Size of the Problem
The most striking facts presented during the September Hearings
concern the scope of the financial assets at stake. The size of the senior
population and the assets seniors do or will control is nothing short of
astounding. In 2006, according to census data, there were more than
thirty-seven million Americans age sixty-five and older, accounting for
12% of the total population.8 There were five million people age eightyfive and older, nearly two million in their nineties, and more than 73,000
Americans age 100 or older.9 While seniors make up a very substantial
minority of this country, seniors control a majority of this country’s
financial assets. As of 2007, seniors owned 80% of all the money in
U.S. savings and loan institutions, and 77% of all financial assets in
America.10 As of 2007, it was estimated that Americans sixty-five or
older held $15 trillion of assets.11 These numbers are continuing to
grow as the baby boom generation ages. Americans aged fifty-five to
sixty-four have the highest income and net worth of any age group, and
households led by people over forty own more than 91% of the nation’s
wealth.12
The size of the senior population and its wealth has an enormous
effect on public policy decisions designed to help seniors. It means that
any restriction on or privilege accorded to seniors will affect a majority
of the country’s financial assets. This has enormous implications. For
instance, if Congress decided that a financial product was inappropriate
for seniors and prohibited its sale to those sixty-five or older, that
financial product would find its potential market shrunk by more than
half, because seniors control a majority of financial assets.
Despite their strength in numbers, on an individual basis, seniors are

7. Cf. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 511 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of
legislative history is illegitimate and ill advised in the interpretation of any statute . . . .”).
8. Protecting Senior Citizens from Investment Fraud: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on
Aging, 110th Cong. 21 (2007) [hereinafter Protecting Senior Citizens] (statement of Christopher Cox,
Chairman, United States Securities and Exchange Commission).
9. Id.
10. Senior Fraud and the Sale of Annuities: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 110th
Cong. 33 (2007) [hereinafter Senior Fraud] (statement of Lori Swanson, Attorney Gen., State of
Minnesota).
11. Protecting Senior Citizens, supra note 8, at 21.
12. Id.
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extremely vulnerable. According to a 2008 medical study, one third of
people over the age of seventy-one suffer from cognitive impairment—
meaning that approximately 8.8 million seniors have mild cognitive
impairment, dementia, or changes in executive cognitive functions.13
Cognitive impairment, in turn, makes people “more likely to make
financial errors and more willing to gamble with their money.”14
Chairman Cox of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
testified that one reason that seniors are victimized is the “declining
mental faculties of senior investors which negatively impacts their
personal financial management.”15 This victimization also causes
disproportionate harm to seniors because “when seniors lose their life’s
savings, they lack the time to rebuild a nest egg.”16 Seniors themselves
are well aware of their vulnerability. Though a statistic does not
generally trigger an emotional response, it is hard not to find
heartbreaking the fact that surveys conducted by the American
Association for Retired Persons (AARP) found that “[t]hree out of five
older Americans fear death less than they fear running out of money
before they die . . . .”17
Unfortunately, this fear is well-founded, as the scope of the
victimization of seniors is striking. According to a 2011 report by
MetLife Inc., the annual loss by victims of elder abuse is $2.9 billion, up
$300 million in just four years.18 This large loss number corresponds to
a large number of victims. According to estimates, at least one in five
Americans over the age of sixty-five has been a victim of financial
fraud.19 Even more dramatically, the Elder Financial Abuse Task Team
Report to the California Commission on Aging found that over 70% of

13. See Elizabeth Olson, When Abuse of Older Patients Is Financial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011,
at F11 (quoting Dr. Robert E. Roush, Director of the Texas Consortium Geriatric Education Center at
the Baylor College of Medicine); see also Brenda L. Plassman et al., Prevalence of Cognitive
Impairment Without Dementia in the United States, 148 ANNALS INTERNAL MED, 6, 427–34 (2008)
(cited in ROBERT E. ROUSH & AANAND NAIK, PREVENTING ELDER INVESTMENT FRAUD: ASSESSING
FOR VULNERABILITY TO FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION, available at http://www.americangeriatrics.org/
files/documents/annual_meeting/2012/handouts/thursday/R0730-5305_Robert_E._Roush.pdf).
14. Olson, supra note 13.
15. Protecting Senior Citizens, supra note 8, at 22 (“A recent study by a researcher from the
Federal Reserve and a professor at the University of Texas is only the most recent of many to suggest
that one reason is the declining mental faculties of senior investors, which negatively impacts their
personal financial management.”).
16. Id.
17. Olson, supra note 13.
18. See David Crary, Scams Targeting the Elderly on the Rise, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 4,
2012, www. charlotteobserver.com/2012/03/04/3066742/scams-targeting-the-elderly-on.html.
19. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Speech by Commisioner: Why
seniors Are More Vulnerable Now As Targets for Financial Abuse, (Mar. 15, 2012) (delivered by
Smeeta Ramarathnam, Comm’r Aguilar’s Chief of Staff).
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people over the age of fifty had been fraudulently solicited.20
This reality was discussed extensively at the 2007 hearing.
According to the testimony of Joseph P. Borg, Director of the Alabama
Securities Commission and President of the North American Securities
Administrators Association (NASAA),21 preliminary results from a 2007
study of NASAA’s members revealed that 44% of investor complaints
came from seniors.22 This significantly understates the scope of senior
financial victimization because senior complaints are generally
underreported due to issues of shame or ignorance.23 In fact, it is
estimated that only one in twenty-five cases of elder financial abuse is
reported.24 Furthermore, these are not bogus complaints. Since 2004,
more than 75% of the annuity complaints reported by state regulators to
NAIC have been resolved in favor of the consumer.25 Even without
taking into account underreporting, however, it is clear that seniors are
disproportionately victimized by financial fraud, and that there is a
poisonous combination of mentally vulnerable seniors with vast
financial resources being preyed upon by unscrupulous people.
B. The Shape of the Problem: How Seniors Are Victimized
Financial scams vary widely, but there are some patterns and common
practices. One common practice is the sale of inappropriate financial
products, especially certain types of annuities. According to the
testimony of Director Joseph Borg, a massive “thirty-four percent of all
cases of senior exploitation involved variable or equity index
annuities.”26 According to the Testimony of Minnesota Attorney
General Lori Swanson, some insurance companies offer large
commissions and other incentives especially to salesmen who sell long20. RICHARD RYDER & CHERI JASINSKI, ELDER FINANCIAL ABUSE TASK TEAM REPORT TO THE
CALIFORNIA
COMMISSION
ON
AGING
(2005),
available
at
http://www.ccoa.ca.gov/res/docs/pubs/Elder_Financial_Abuse.pdf.
21. The oldest international organization devoted to investor protection, the North American
Securities Administrators Association, Inc., was founded in 1919. Its membership consists of the
securities administrators in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Canada, Mexico, Puerto Rico and the
U.S. Virgin Islands. See About Us, NASAA, www.nasaa.org/about-us/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
22. See Advising seniors About Their Money: Who Is Qualified—and Who Is Not?: Hearing
Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 110th Cong. 56 (2007) [hereinafter Borg, Advising Seniors]
(statement of Joseph P. Borg, Director, Alabama Securities Commission and President, North American
Securities Administrators Association). See Senior Fraud, supra note 10, at 39.
23. See Senior Fraud, supra note 10, at 39.
24. Leslie Callaway & Jerry Becker, Stopping the Financial Abuse of seniors, ABA BANK
COMPLIANCE, July–Aug. 2011, at 12.
25. Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 110th Cong. 75 (2007) (statement of Sandy
Praeger, Kansas Insurance Commissioner and National Association of Insurance Commissioners
President–Elect).
26. Borg, Advising Seniors, supra note 22, at 56 (emphasis added).
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term deferred annuities (a product generally not appropriate for seniors),
to senior citizens.27 Attorney General Swanson also described in detail
the workings of the so-called “Million Dollar Academy” at “Annuity
University,” which trains agents how to be a “success in the senior
market.” According to Swanson, an investigative journalist for the Wall
Street Journal attended “Annuity University” at which the following
advice was given to insurance agents about how to “push annuities on
senior citizens”:
Treat them like they’re blind twelve-year-olds.
There’s the technical answer, and there’s the senior answer. Tell them
it’s like a CD—it’s safe, it’s guaranteed.
You’re there to solve their problems, but you have to create those
problems first. No problem, no sale. So at the seminars, you’re creating
problems, and you tease them with the solutions . . . .
They thrive on fear, anger and greed. Show them their finances are all
screwed up so they think, ‘Oh, no, I’ve done it all wrong.’ This will
make you money.
Tell them you can protect their life savings from nursing home and
Medicaid seizure of assets. They don’t know what it is, but it sounds
scary. It’s about putting a pitchfork in their chest.28

In addition to certain types of financial products, there are certain
types of scams that are used over and over again. According to a study
by the NASD Investor Foundation, fraudsters use “social influence
tactics to get their victims to sign on.”29 Among the most common
“social influence tactics” are dangling the prospect of wealth or prizes to
tempt seniors; convincing seniors that peers, neighbors, and other
respected people in the community are all making this particular
investment; describing the investment as a rare opportunity to force the
senior to act quickly; and creating reciprocity, e.g., providing the senior
a small favor, like a free lunch, to induce the senior to feel obligated to
return the favor by buying the investment. More recently, some of the
most “popular” scams used to target seniors are fraudsters claiming to
be calling from the government (often the Social Security
Administration or the IRS), the Grandparent Scam (impostors posing as
a grandchild in need of cash to cope with an emergency), the
homecoming fraud (con artists pose as soldiers serving in Afghanistan
needing money for their homecoming), the ever-popular lottery scam
(telling seniors they won the lottery or another prize, but need to pay
27. Senior Fraud, supra note 10, at 34.
28. Id. at 35–36.
29. Protecting Senior Citizens, supra note 8, at 23.
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some money to receive it), and the amusingly titled, but unfortunately
no less painful Toilet Paper Scam, where fraudsters persuade seniors to
pay exorbitant sums of money for goods and services (e.g., special toilet
paper to comply with new regulations and not destroy their septic
tanks).30
There are also patterns to victimization. In August of 2009, the U.S.
Administration on Aging described to Congress four common scenarios
by which a senior can become a victim: (1) seniors are a “financial
prisoner,” as they are physically and perhaps psychologically dependent
on their caregiver; (2) seniors are losing their ability to handle their
financial affairs due to physical or cognitive impairment and a “new best
friend” gradually assumes responsibility for handling the senior’s affairs
and abuses that trust; (3) a widow or widower does not know how to
handle the financial affairs which his or her deceased spouse took care
of, and gets taken advantage of by someone offering assistance; and (4)
seniors, perhaps out of fear or paranoia, refuse help or financial advice
from reliable, responsible relatives or other individuals and instead turn
to strangers.31
In an effort to illustrate the problem, a number of witnesses at the
2007 hearing shared heart-wrenching stories of the victimization of
specific seniors. Chairman Cox, of the SEC, told the Committee about
his parents. Despite the fact that his mother was suffering from throat
cancer and could barely speak, and his father was in the throes of
Alzheimer’s disease, they received repeated unsolicited pitches (both
over the phone and in person) for an endless amount of annuity schemes
and mortgage offers. The products pushed by these brokers were
affirmatively harmful to people in circumstances like Chairman Cox’s
parents. The annuity products locked away savings with huge penalties
for withdrawal and the mortgages were equally bad if not worse.
Chairman Cox cited the example of one salesman who called over a
dozen times pushing his mother to refinance her safe, low-rate thirtyyear mortgage with a short-term loan that had a balloon and a teaser
rate—a deal that would have cost his parents their home when it came
due. Even though Chairman Cox personally warned him never to call
her again, he continued.32
Nicholas A. Nicolette, President of the Financial Planning

30. David Crary, Scams Targeting Older Americans Enriching Con Artists and Law
Enforcement Find the Crimes Among the Toughest to Prosecute, NBCNEWS.COM (Mar. 4, 2012, 11:32
AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/46574273/ns/business-personal_finance/t/scams-targeting-olderamericans-enriching-con-artists/#.T-hri3km-YI.
31. See Callaway, supra note 24, at 12–13 (citing U.S. ADMIN. ON AGING, FINANCIAL
EXPLOITATION OF OLDER PERSONS: REPORT TO CONGRESS (2009)).
32. Protecting Senior Citizens, supra note 8, at 22.
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Association, shared the story of a 79-year-old Pennsylvania man who
was victimized by an unscrupulous annuity salesman.33 The 79-year-old
man was persuaded by the agent to sign a power of attorney, giving the
agent access to the victim’s CDs, cash and mutual funds. The salesman
put all of these assets in “unsuitable annuities.” After learning that he
had been wiped out, the man went into a deep depression and died. The
insurance company tried to remedy the wrong committed by the
salesman by offering the man his money back. The offer was received
by the man’s family via a letter, which arrived on the day of the funeral,
and his family buried him with the letter in his pocket. Mr. Nicolette
concluded by revealing that the salesman in question was still in
business, despite being sanctioned several times by state officials.34
C. The Stubbornness of the Problem: Why We Haven’t Stopped Senior
Financial Abuse
Senior financial abuse is not going away; in fact, it is rapidly growing
into a bigger and bigger problem. As mentioned above, according to a
2011 report, the annual loss by victims of elder abuse is at $2.9 billion,
up dramatically from $2.6 billion in 2008.35 This is despite the fact that
the problematic behavior at issue (the scams or sales of inappropriate
financial products) is generally criminalized, or at least universally
strongly disapproved of, and there is heightened awareness of the
problem. So why is financial abuse of seniors going up instead of
down?
There are a number of reasons for this. First, from a law enforcement
perspective, seniors are nightmare victims for three reasons: (1) as
discussed above, they are reluctant to come forward and report the
crime, which makes awareness of the crime, much less catching
criminals, extraordinarily difficult; (2) even if a crime is reported, a
senior may not have all of his or her mental facilities, which may make
her a very problematic witness—especially in a he-said-she-said case
(“Mr. Smith told me he wanted to buy this structured annuity,” “Mr.
Smith gave me the money,” etc.); and (3) seniors, by definition, are
elderly, and cases take a long time to be resolved—there is a real danger
that a senior may not be around or capable of testifying at a trial even if
she was mentally and physically healthy when victimized. All three of
these reasons make it very difficult for traditional law enforcement
33. Advising seniors About Their Money: Who’s Qualified—and Who’s Not?: Hearing Before
the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 110th Cong. 66 (2007) (statement of Nicholas A. Nicolette, President of
the Financial Planning Association).
34. Id.
35. Crary, supra note 30.
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efforts to effectively target senior fraud.
Second, regulation of insurance companies and most fraud crimes
occurs at the state level. This is problematic because much of the fraud
that goes on is often by out-of-state or even international actors.
Everyone is familiar with the internet fraudsters from Nigeria and the
computer hackers of the former Soviet Union, but there are other
hotbeds of senior fraud too. For instance, so many recent lottery scam
calls have come from Jamaica that its 876 area code is now cited as a
warning sign by experts.36 The 2007 hearing included testimony that it
was difficult for state regulators to go after fraudsters like sponsors of
deceptive marketing materials because many of those entities are located
outside the investigating state and questioned the jurisdiction of the state
agency.37
Moreover, the states simply do not have the resources—whether
measured in finances, knowledge, or manpower—to effectively deal
with this enormous and rapidly growing problem. A study by the
General Accounting Office (GAO) found that state Adult Protective
Services programs’ “challenges” included growth in caseloads and an
increase in the complexity of those cases.38 These programs deal with
these increasing challenges with decreasing resources. The GAO found
that twenty-five of the thirty-eight states surveyed had total Adult
Protective Services funding remain static or decrease over the past five
years and “program officials . . . ranked insufficient funding for program
operations as the most significant challenge they faced.”39
Third, many key actors do not know how to deal with seniors or their
special needs. Mr. Edwin J. Pittock, President of the Society of
Certified Senior Advisors, testified that “[t]here is only a one in six
chance that an American university offers one or more courses in
gerontology” and “[f]ew companies who have seniors as customers
require any education for their employees.”40 Furthermore, according to
Mr. Pittock, he is:
unaware of any state or federal requirement that anyone working with

36. Id.
37. Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 110th Cong. 50 (2007) (statement of William
Francis Galvin, Secretaryy of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts) (“Our investigation into many of
the sponsors of the marketing materials described above proved quite difficult, because many of those
sponsors are located outside of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and were not forthcoming in their
responses to our requests for information. Moreover, a number of them questioned our jurisdiction over
entities not based in Massachusetts.”).
38. Aguilar, supra note 19.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Educating Professionals to Serve seniors Better: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on
Aging, 110th Cong. 104 (2007) (statement of Edwin J. Pittock, President, Society of Certified senior
Advisors).
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seniors gain even a minimal amount of knowledge (unless it is within
their own discipline) about how seniors are different and the optimal
ways to work with them, such as determining whether a client has
dementia and being able to recognize factors that can lead to abuse.41

II. DODD–FRANK: A FIRST STEP TOWARD PROTECTING SENIORS’
FINANCIAL SECURITY
Many of the problems and solutions discussed at the 2007 Hearing
were reflected in those provisions of Dodd–Frank that safeguard the
elderly. Section 989A of Dodd–Frank defines a “senior citizen” or
“senior” as anyone 62 years or older.42 This age was chosen because it
corresponds to the lowest age at which an individual can begin to collect
Social Security.43 Dodd–Frank mentions “senior,” in reference to those
62 years of age or older, in a scant four provisions scattered amongst its
848 pages.
A. Section 911 of Dodd–Frank: The Investor Advisory Committee
Section 911 of the Act modifies the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
in order to create an “investor advisory committee,” which must include
a “representative of the interests of senior citizens.” The Act requires
that the other members of the “investor advisory committee” consist of
the Investor Advocate,44 a representative of state securities
commissions, and between ten and twenty individuals who:
(i) represent the interests of individual equity and debt investors,
including investors in mutual funds; (ii) represent the interests of
institutional investors, including the interests of pension funds and
registered investment companies; (iii) are knowledgeable about

41. Id. at 108.
42. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376, § 989A(7) (2010).
43. Telephone Interview with Ken Willis, supra note 3. Today, at the age of sixty-two, a person
can collect a reduced social security benefit. This is actually a relatively new option, introduced in 1956
for women and for men in 1961. See Lenore A. Epstein, Early Retirement and Work–Life Experience,
BULLETIN, Mar. 1966, available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v29n3/v29n3p3.pdf. Originally,
social security was only available at age sixty-five, an age selected based on the fact that prevailing
retirement ages for the pension system available at the time were either sixty-five or seventy. Roughly
half the state pension systems used sixty-five, as did the federal Railroad Retirement System, passed by
Congress earlier in 1934. Frequently Asked Questions: The Origins of the Retirement Age in Social
Security, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, http://www.ssa.gov/history/age65.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
44. The Investor Advocate, a position created by Section 915 of the Act, reports directly to the
Chairman of the Securities & Exchange Commission and his assignment is to protect the interests of
investors. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376, § 915 (2010).
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investment issues and decisions; and (iv) have reputations of integrity.45

The purpose of the “investment advisory committee” is to advise and
consult with the Commission on: (1) regulatory priorities of the
Commission; (2) issues relating to the regulation of securities products,
trading strategies, and fee structures, and the effectiveness of disclosure;
(3) initiatives to protect investor interest; and (4) initiatives to promote
investor confidence and the integrity of the securities marketplace.46
The Commission must, each time the “investment advisory committee”
submits a finding or recommendation, promptly issue a public statement
assessing it and disclosing what action, if any, the Commission will take
in response.47
The existence of a single, guaranteed seat on the “investor advisory
committee” reveals a great deal about the attitude of Congress, as
expressed in Dodd–Frank, about senior citizen finances. First, the
presence of a dedicated seat to represent senior interests shows that
Congress believes that senior citizens have special interests and needs
that are distinct from those of the interests of individual debt and equity
investors.48 Second, the fact that only a single seat is reserved for senior
45. Id. Interestingly, while the statute specifically provides for the appointment of the between
ten and twenty members of the “investment advisory committee” who represent the investing public by
the Commission and there are specific statutory provisions governing the selection of the Investor
Advocate there is no specific provision for appointing the representative of the interests of senior
citizens or the representative of State securities commissions. In practice, however, all members of the
investment advisory committee were nominated by all five sitting SEC Commissioners. See id.
§ 911(b)(1)(D), § 915; see also Press Release, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Members of
New Investor Advisory Comm. (Apr. 9, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/201258.htm.
46. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376, § 911(a)(2)(A) (2010).
47. Id. § 911(g).
48. The current members of the investment advisory committee are: Darcy Bradbury, Managing
Director and Director of External Affairs, D.E. Shaw & Co., L.P.; J. Robert Brown, Jr., Law Professor,
University of Denver; Joseph Dear, Chief Investment Officer, California Public Employees’ Retirement
System; Eugene Duffy, Partner and Principal, Paradigm Asset Management Co. LLC; Roger Ganser,
Chairman of the Board of Directors of BetterInvesting; James Glassman, Executive Director, George W.
Bush Institute; Craig Goettsch, Director of Investor Education and Consumer Outreach, Iowa Insurance
Division; Joseph Grundfest, William A. Franke Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School;
Mellody Hobson, President and Director of Ariel Investments, LLC; Stephen Holmes, General Partner
and Chief Operating Officer, InterWest Partners; Adam Kanzer, Managing Director and General
Counsel of Domini Social Investments and Chief Legal Officer of the Domini Funds; Roy Katzovicz,
Partner, Investment Team Member and Chief Legal Officer, Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P.;
Barbara Roper, Director of Investor Protection, Consumer Federation of America; Kurt Schacht,
Managing Director, CFA Institute; Alan Schnitzer, Vice Chairman and Chief Legal Officer, The
Travelers Companies, Inc.; Jean Setzfand, Director of Financial Security for the AARP; Anne Sheehan,
Director of Corporate Governance, California State Teachers’ Retirement System; Damon Silvers,
Associate General Counsel for the AFL-CIO; Mark Tresnowski, Managing Director and General
Counsel, Madison Dearborn Partners, LLC; Steven Wallman, Founder and Chief Executive Officer,
Foliofn, Inc.; Ann Yerger, Executive Director, Council of Institutional Investors. See Press Release,
Sec. and Exch. Comm., supra note 45. Though the SEC press release did not specifically identify which
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interests, while between ten and twenty are for institutional and
individual investors, indicates that Congress believes senior interests are
either less important than, or generally not in conflict with, the interests
of individual and institutional investors.49
B. The Model Rules: Sections 989A & 989J of Dodd–Frank
Section 989A of the Act, entitled senior Investor Protections, is one
of the most detailed provisions of Dodd–Frank addressing fraudulent
schemes that target seniors. Subsection 989A(b) establishes a grant
program under which Grants may be made to:
(1) hire staff to identify, investigate, and prosecute cases involving
misleading or fraudulent marketing; (2) fund law enforcement efforts to
identify salespersons and advisers who target seniors through the use of
misleading designations; (3) increase funding for the successful
prosecution of salespersons and advisers who target seniors with the use
of misleading designations; (4) provide educational materials and training
to regulators on the appropriateness of the use of designations by
salespersons and advisers in connection with the sale and marketing of
financial products; (5) provide educational materials and training to
seniors to increase awareness and understanding of misleading or
fraudulent marketing; (6) develop comprehensive plans to combat
misleading or fraudulent marketing of financial products to seniors; and
(7) enhance provisions of State law to provide protection for seniors
against misleading or fraudulent marketing.50

This aspect of Section 989A is revelatory because of the financial
danger to seniors it identifies and targets—misleading or fraudulent
marketing of financial products and the con artists and fraudsters who
target seniors with these methods—and the proposals it puts forward in
response. Section 989A takes two approaches to these dangers—six out
of the seven clauses play offense by spending money to encourage more
effective law enforcement efforts to catch and deter fraudsters who
target seniors.51 Section 989A(b)(5) plays defense against these
fraudsters by permitting funds to be applied to educate seniors to
member of the investment advisory council represents senior interests, it is presumably Jean Setzfand,
Director of Financial Security for the AARP.
49. If there was ever a conflict between senior interests and those of individual/institutional
investors, the single senior vote would be overwhelmed by the ten to twenty votes of those representing
individual/institutional investors. Congress must not have been concerned about this outcome either
because they did not care if senior interests were outvoted or, perhaps more likely, because they
believed that institutional/individual and senior interests would usually be compatible, and at the very
least, rarely be in conflict.
50. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376, § 989A(b)(1)–(7) (2010).
51. See id.
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increase their awareness and understanding of misleading or fraudulent
marketing.
Section 989A also has a second prong for effecting change. The
maximum amount of these 989A grants ($500,000 for three consecutive
fiscal years) is available only if a state has adopted rules that: (1) meet
or exceed the minimum requirements of the NASAA model rule on the
Use of Senior-Specific Certifications and Professional Designations (or
any successor thereto), (2) regulate the sale of insurance of products in a
way that conforms to the minimum requirements of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) model regulation on
the Use of Senior-Specific Certifications and Professional Designations
in the Sale of Life Insurance and Annuities (or any successor thereto),
and (3) regulate fiduciary or suitability requirements in the sale of
annuities that meet or exceed the minimum requirements established by
the Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation (SATMR) of
NAIC (or any successor thereto).52 States are only eligible for grants of
$100,000 if they meet the first or the second and third of these
requirements, and are presumably ineligible for grants if they fall below
these minimum requirements.53
The approach taken in this portion of Section 989A can be
characterized in three ways. First, with its use of the various model
rules and regulations cited above as baselines, it is pushing
standardization across the fifty states. This one size fits all states
approach indicates that Congress believes that the victimization of
seniors by fraudsters is both a nationwide problem and one that can
benefit from relative uniformity of laws over all states. Second, it is a
very gentle push towards standardization. The federal government is
not enacting or creating its own federal law or regulation, instead it is
encouraging the adoption of standards that meet or exceed minimum
requirements created by groups of state regulators.54 This is a very
flexible and deferential approach by the federal government.
Furthermore, the grants, at a maximum of $500,000 a year, are very
modest. This is not the federal government using its power of the purse
to coerce states to do its bidding; instead this is, at most, a tiny nudge to
go a certain direction or take action. This either reflects the fact that the
goal of the federal government is to encourage and standardize a
growing consensus amongst the states, not to browbeat states in doing
what they don’t want, or that the adoption of the model rules and
regulations or their equivalent is not particularly important to Congress.
The first interpretation is borne out by the facts as they currently exist,
52. Id. § 989A(e)(1).
53. Id. § 989A(e)(2).
54. Id. § 989A(e)(1).
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because, as of February 2012, twenty-eight states and the District of
Columbia had enacted the NAIC model regulation, and thirty states and
the District of Columbia have enacted the NASAA model regulation.55
Evidencing a similarly broad consensus, as of March 6, 2011, the
National Conference of Insurance Legislators endorsed NAIC’s
SATMR.56
Third, the substance of the model rules and regulations Dodd–Frank
endorses reflect distinctive approaches to protecting seniors. The
NASAA model rule, adopted on March 20, 2008, prohibits the use of a
senior-specific certification or designation in selling securities in a
misleading way which includes:
(a) use of a certification or professional designation by a person who has
not actually earned or is otherwise ineligible to use such certification or
designation; (b) use of a nonexistent or self-conferred certification or
professional designation; (c) use of a certification or professional
designation that indicates or implies a level of occupational qualifications
obtained through education, training, or experience that the person using
the certification or professional designation does not have; and (d) use of
a certification or professional designation that was obtained from a
designating or certifying organization that: (i) is primarily engaged in the
business of instruction in sales and/or marketing; (ii) does not have
reasonable standards or procedures for assuring the competency of its
designees or certificants; (iii) does not have reasonable standards or
procedures for monitoring and disciplining its designees or certificants
for improper or unethical conduct; or (iv) does not have reasonable
continuing education requirements for its designees or certificants in
order to maintain the designation or certificate.57

The model rule also creates a rebuttable presumption that a
designating or certifying organization is not disqualified solely for
purposes of paragraph 1(d) above when the organization has been
accredited by: (i) The American National Standards Institute; or (ii) The
National Commission for Certifying Agencies; or (iii) an organization
that is on the United States Department of Education’s list entitled
55. NAIFA Supports NCOIL Resolution on senior-Specific Designations, NAIFA BLOG (Feb. 29,
2012, 11:34 AM), http://www.naifablog.com/2012/02/index.html.
56. Press Release, Nat’l Conference of Ins. Regulators, NCOIL Supports NAIC Suitability
Model,
Recommends
to
States
(Mar.
6,
2011),
available
at
http://www.ncoil.org/HomePage/2011/03092011AnnuitySuitability.pdf. A current, state-by-state list of
the adoption of the Annuity Transactions Model Regulation has been compiled by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners. NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, SUSTAINABILITY IN ANNUITY
TRANSACTIONS MODEL REGULATION: 2012 LEGISLATION/RULEMAKING (2012), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_a_leg_prog_suitability_120420.pdf.
57. NORTH AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, NASAA MODEL RULE ON THE USE OF SENIOR-SPECIFIC
CERTIFICATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL DESIGNATIONS (2008), available at http://www.nasaa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/3-senior_Model_Rule_Adopted.pdf.
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“Accrediting Agencies Recognized for Title IV Purposes” and the
designation or credential issued therefrom does not primarily apply to
sales and/or marketing.58
The NAIC model for insurance regulation is almost identical in
substance to the NASAA model rule for securities as it has essentially
the same prohibitions and also creates a rebuttable presumption in favor
of the same three organizations.59
In other words, NAIC (and thus Dodd–Frank), advocated for at most
a middle-of-the-road approach with regard to senior certifications. By
giving preferences, but not exclusivity, to organizations approved by the
American National Standards Institute, the National Commission for
Certifying Agencies, and the Department of Education, NAIC created a
safe harbor for organizations and, in some ways, perhaps a gold standard
for knowledgeable people evaluating certifications. At the same time,
however, the vagueness of the standards and their refusal to create a
centralized list of qualifying organizations (or even a central list of
disqualified organizations) permitted the continued proliferation of
senior-certifying organizations and did not, by any stretch of the
imagination, eliminate confusion.
The SATMR is similarly weak. To its credit, this model regulation
does impose some significant duties on insurers and insurance
producers. Section six of the SATMR has a suitability requirement that
states: (1) that an insurance producer or insurer “shall have reasonable
grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for the
consumer on the basis of the facts disclosed by the consumer as to his or
her investments and other insurance products and as to his or her
financial situation and needs, including the consumer’s suitability
information,” (2) that the customer has been “reasonably informed of
various features of the annuity,” (3) that the “consumer would benefit
from certain features of the annuity,” (4) that “[t]he particular annuity as
a whole” is suitable based on the consumer’s suitability information, and
various similar recommendations for replacement annuities.60 The
SATMR also requires insurers to “make reasonable efforts to obtain the
consumer’s suitability information.”61 In addition, the SATMR requires
the memorialization of any recommendation to purchase an annuity, the
58. Id.
59. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, NAIC MODEL REGULATION ON THE USE OF SENIORSPECIFIC CERTIFICATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL DESIGNATIONS IN THE SALE OF LIFE INSURANCE AND
ANNUITIES
(2008),
available
at
http://www.acli.com/Events/Documents/0356d2f9b6f84c3ca3140d5d5dd50b4fPagesfromWed072209C
hronologicallyChallengedLeiferD.pdf.
60. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, SUITABILITY IN ANNUITY TRANSACTIONS MODEL
REGULATION (2010), available at http://www.limra.com/pdfs/compliance/AnnuityStability.pdf.
61. Id. § 6(B).
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establishment of supervision systems, and certain minimal training
requirements.62
All of these are good and relatively uncontroversial steps. The flaw
in the Annuity Rule, however, is that it only goes halfway. There are a
number of industry-friendly exceptions and provisions that make the
Annuity Rule more of a strongly worded suggestion than a fierce
command. First, Subsection (D) of Annuity Rule six exempts any
insurer or insurance company from the strictures of the model rules if
the insurer did not make a “recommendation,” if the consumer provided
inaccurate data, if the consumer refuses to provide suitability
information, or if the consumer decides to purchase an annuity not based
on the recommendation of the insurer. These all sound sensible, but an
unscrupulous agent could drive a truck through this exception by
claiming that he was not providing a recommendation when he was, in
fact, pushing a particular product. In short, these exceptions run the risk
of swallowing the rule for those who would take advantage of seniors.
Second, the penalties for not obeying the Annuity Rule are vague and
forgiving. If a violation occurs,
the commissioner may order: (1) An insurer to take reasonably
appropriate corrective action for any consumer harmed by the insurer’s,
or by its insurance producer’s, violation of this regulation; (2) A general
agency, independent agency or the insurance producer to take reasonably
appropriate corrective action for any consumer harmed by the insurance
producer’s violation of this regulation; and (3) Appropriate penalties and
sanctions.63

Moreover, there is a mercy exception to even these discretionary
penalties. According to the Annuity Rule, any penalty “may be reduced
or eliminated . . . if corrective action for the consumer was taken
promptly after a violation was discovered or the violation was not part
of a pattern or practice.”64 Moreover, the Annuity Rule explicitly
eliminates the possibility of private actions to enforce the law, stating
baldly that “[n]othing herein shall be construed to create or imply a
private cause of action for a violation of this regulation.”65
In addition to encouraging the adoption of the model rules discussed
above via grants, Dodd–Frank also utilizes other carrots for state
adoption. Section 989J of the Act encourages the use of the model rules
of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners by giving
substantial advantages to insurance companies who issue policies

62.
63.
64.
65.

See id. §§ 6–7.
Id. § 8 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. § 1(B).
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subject to the laws of states who have adopted the NAIC model
regulations.66
Specifically, 989J mandates that the SEC “treat as exempt securities
described under section 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act of 1933,” and any
insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annuity
contract so long as it has certain characteristics and is issued on or after
June 26, 2013 in a state or issued by an insurance domiciled in a state
that: (1) adopts rules which substantially meet or exceed the minimum
requirements established by the suitability in Annuity Transactions
model regulation adopted by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners in March 2010; and (2) adopts rules that substantially
meet or exceed the minimum requirements of any successor
modifications to the model regulations or is issued by an insurance
company that implements practices on a nationwide basis that meet or
exceed the minimum requirements established by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners Suitability in Annuity
Transactions Model Regulation (Model 275), and any successor thereto,
and is therefore subject to examination by the State of domicile of the
insurance company, or by any other state where the insurance company
conducts sales of such products, for the purpose of monitoring
compliance under this section.67
This is a different, and far more muscular, approach to encourage the
adoption of NAIC model rules than that taken by 989A. By giving
insurance companies who issue policies under the laws of states who
adopt NAIC model rules a competitive advantage by exempting them
from liability under the Securities Act of 1933, 989J of Dodd–Frank
may give those states a substantial boost in attracting insurance
companies. Conversely, it penalizes the states who do not adopt the
NAIC model rules. The 1933 Act exemption, moreover, in providing a
reward to insurance companies who issue policies in states compliant
with the NAIC model rules, acts in concert with 989A by eliminating, or
at least reducing, the possibility that states who adopt the NAIC model
rules will lose insurance business because of it.
Interestingly, 989J also gives a great deal of power, sight unseen, to
the future acts of NAIC by making the adoption of future rules
promulgated by NAIC a requirement to keeping the 1933 Act
exemption—without any caveats or restrictions on what those future
rules might say.68 This is an extraordinary delegation of federal
authority to a collection of state agencies as it gives them the power to
66. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376, § 989J (2010).
67. See id.
68. See id. § 989J(a)(3)(A)(ii).
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exempt a large swathe of financial products from a core federal statute.
C. Section 1013(g) of Dodd Frank: The Office of Financial Protection
for Older Americans
Section 1013(g) provides for the establishment of the Office of
Financial Protection for Older Americans (Office for Older Americans),
the functions of which shall include activities designed to facilitate the
financial literacy of individuals who have attained the age of 62 years or
more . . . on protection from unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices and
on current and future financial choices, including through the
dissemination of materials to seniors on such topics.69

The Office for Older Americans is designed to focus on the financial
education of seniors, to monitor the certification of those who provide
financial advice to seniors, and to research best practices.
Specifically, the educational mandate of the Office for Older
Americans is to:
[D]evelop goals for programs that provide seniors financial literacy and
counseling, including programs that—(i) help seniors recognize warning
signs of unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices, protect themselves from
such practices; (ii) provide one-on-one financial counseling on issues
including long-term savings and later-life economic security; and (iii)
provide personal consumer credit advocacy to respond to consumer
problems caused by unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices.70

This mandate “to develop goals for programs” is fuzzy, but it seems to
be encouraging the creation or adoption of a set of best practices to
educate seniors about personal finances.
Again, Dodd–Frank
encourages coordination and standardization, but does not coerce it or
determine the substance of what should be standardized.
The role of the Office for Older Americans regarding certifications is
monitoring and recommendations. Specifically, the Office for Older
Americans is tasked with monitoring “certifications or designations of
financial advisors who advise seniors and alert the Commission and
State regulators of certifications or designations that are identified as
unfair, deceptive, or abusive” and the submission to Congress and the
SEC
any legislative and regulatory recommendations on the best practices for
(i) disseminating information regarding the legitimacy of certifications of
financial advisers who advise seniors; (ii) methods in which a senior can
identify the financial advisor most appropriate for the senior’s needs; and
69. Id § 1013(g)(1).
70. Id. § 1013(g)(3).
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(iii) methods in which a senior can verify a financial advisor’s
credentials.71

This sets up the Office for Older Americans as a center for expertise on
senior advisors and certifications, but without any independent power to
exercise that expertise.
The research role of the Officer for Older Americans is similar. The
Office for Older Americans is tasked with conducting “research to
identify best practices and effective methods, tools, technology and
strategies to educate and counsel seniors about personal finance
management with a focus on—(i) protecting themselves from unfair,
deceptive, and abusive practices; (ii) long-term savings; and (iii)
planning for retirement and long-term care.”72 Again, the Office for
Older Americans is a bastion of expertise without authority to
implement or enforce best practices.
The Office for Older Americans is encouraged to share its expertise
with other organizations with more clout and reach. Section 1013
directs the Office for Older Americans “coordinate consumer protection
efforts of seniors with other Federal agencies and State regulators” and
work with community organizations, non-profit organizations, and other
entities that are involved with educating or assisting seniors.73
III. WHY DODD–FRANK FALLS SHORT: STEPS NECESSARY TO PROTECT
SENIORS FROM FINANCIAL ABUSE
As discussed above, Dodd–Frank took some important steps towards
combating the financial abuse of seniors, including most importantly,
the recognition that seniors are at risk financially and in need of a multilayered response to mitigate that risk. Ultimately, however, the steps it
took, while in the right direction, are too timid to deal with a problem of
this magnitude. This portion of the Article identifies some potential
reasons for the caution exhibited by Congress when drafting Dodd–
Frank and then advocates for three strong, additional steps that should
be taken—namely, making health care workers and financial
representatives mandatory reporters of senior financial abuse, mandating
that brokers and insurance employees owe a fiduciary duty to their
customers, and requiring a license to sell seniors financial products.

71. Id. §§ 1013(g)(3)(B)–(C).
72. Id. § 1013(g)(3)(D).
73. Id. §§ 1013(g)(3)(E)–(F).
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A. Reasons for Caution
As discussed above, Dodd–Frank took a cautious, deferential, and
incremental approach to combating elder abuse. There are a number of
reasons for Congress’s tentativeness. First, one of the main avenues for
elder financial abuse, the sale of inappropriate insurance policies to
seniors, falls squarely within a domain that has long been reserved for
the states. While it has long been recognized that the federal
government can regulate insurance,74 Congress has imposed limitations
on itself in this area. Specifically, the McCarran–Ferguson Act,75
exempts insurance from much federal regulation and law. Of course,
what Congress giveth, Congress can take away, and the historic
reservation of this area for the States does not mean that Congress
cannot change its mind and put federal laws or regulations in place to
protect seniors from inappropriate insurance contracts. This does,
however, probably make Congress more reluctant to legislate in this
area.
Second, the sheer size of the senior population and its wealth makes
the problem of senior financial abuse difficult to deal with. As
discussed above, seniors control a majority of the financial assets of this
country. Therefore, any limitation forbidding seniors from purchasing
certain assets (e.g., certain types of annuities generally inappropriate for
seniors) would decimate the potential market for those securities.
Similarly, any “special” protection afforded to seniors would cover most
of the financial assets in this country. This magnifies the impact of any
general protection for seniors, however small. For instance, if the
federal government enacted a law requiring that any financial advisor
take certain steps before selling securities to seniors, that would slow
down the entire financial market. In other words, the large effect of any
regulation or law that affected seniors and their assets means that
Congress likely (and rightly) wanted to tread carefully and slowly.
Third, while the definition of “senior” adopted by Dodd–Frank
provides a bright-line demarcation exclusively based on age, the
population of seniors is actually very diverse. On the one hand, there
could be a sixty-year-old with early onset dementia who does not count
as a senior under Dodd–Frank, though he could certainly use protection.
On the other hand, there could be luminaries like Warren Buffett (born
in 1930, and the third wealthiest person in the world with the reputation
as the world’s greatest investor)76 and Senator Kohl himself (born in
74. See United States v. South–Eastern. Underwriters Assoc., 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (2012).
76. Warren Buffett, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warren_Buffett (last visited Feb.
16, 2013).
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1935 and, with a net worth of over $250 million, one of the wealthiest
senators)77 who are certainly not financially vulnerable or in need of
special protection by the state at the moment.
To make matters more complicated, both the population of seniors
and the needs of individual seniors are by definition fluid. As people are
constantly getting older, the population of seniors is rapidly changing,
expanding as people age and contracting as they pass away. Being a
senior is not an immutable characteristic like gender or race. Instead, it
is a state of being, which, if one lives long enough, will be achieved.
This makes it less susceptible to certain kinds of protection as the
vulnerable population itself is a moving target as a group. This is also
true on an individual level where one day a senior may be completely
capable and not in need of protection, but a few years down the road he
or she may desperately need the protection of the state. This was
illustrated vividly in the recent prosecution and conviction of Brooke
Astor’s son for grand larceny for stealing money from his wealthy, but
incapacitated mother.78 Brooke Astor, the reigning doyenne of New
York society for many years, was one of the world’s most admired and
influential women for decades—certainly well past the age of sixtytwo.79 At a certain point, however, this dynamic, capable, and powerful
woman became vulnerable because of her age. It is inherently difficult
to design legislation that gives vulnerable seniors the protection they
need without hamstringing seniors who need no protection at all.
All of these factors likely explain Congress’s reluctance to take
bolder steps to protect seniors and prevent financial abuse of the elderly.
B. Additional Steps that Should be Taken
Despite the difficulties described above, there are additional
significant steps that can and should be taken, either by the states or the
federal government, that would likely greatly assist in combating the
scourge of senior financial abuse without having an adverse effect on
financial instruments that are regularly sold. Specifically, laws or
regulations should be enacted to: (1) make certain professionals,
specifically doctors, financial advisors, stock brokers, and insurance
salesmen mandatory reporters for elder financial abuse; (2) establish that
insurance salesmen, insurance companies, stock brokers, and brokerage
houses should all have the responsibilities of a fiduciary to their
77. Herb Kohl, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herb_Kohl (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
78. See
Anthony
D.
Marshall,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
21,
2009,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/anthony_d_marshall/index.html.
79. See Brooke Astor, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brooke_Astor (last visited Feb.
16, 2013).
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customers, and potential customers should have the usual private rights
of action if that duty is breached; and (3) mandate that a license to sell
financial products to seniors should be required. As explained below, if
enacted and implemented properly, each of these approaches could curb
those who might otherwise be inclined to prey on seniors whose mental
capacity and sensibilities are diminished.
1. Mandatory Reporting of Potential Senior Abuse
One of the biggest obstacles to effectively combating the financial
abuse of seniors is the difficulty in detecting it. As described above,
95% of senior financial abuse is never reported due, in large part, to the
shame of senior victims or their inability to seek help.80 Moreover, even
the small fraction of senior financial abuse cases that are reported are
brought to the attention of authorities after the crime has been
committed—and, presumably in almost all cases, after the money is
gone. For the financial scams, especially those involving international
fraudsters, this means that the money of the senior victims are
permanently gone—dealing them a financial blow from which they may
never recover.
One potential solution to this severe reporting problem is to deputize
sentries to keep an eye on seniors by making them mandatory reporters
of potential elder financial abuse. This is already done for child abuse,
with teachers, doctors and various other professionals required, by state
law, to report any potential signs of child abuse to authorities.81 The
rationale for mandatory reporting of child abuse is that in many cases
children are unable to understand abuse or bring it to the attention of
authorities, both because of the limitations that their age imposes on
their ability to independently communicate and because many times the
abuser is a family member or family friend whom the child either cares
about or is afraid of because of their constant proximity. The exact
same concerns apply to elder abuse. Seniors suffering from cognitive
impairment often cannot fully understand abuse (especially financial
abuse) or bring it to the attention of authorities because of the limitations
imposed by their mental state. Furthermore, even where seniors
understand that they are the victim of financial abuse, they may be
reluctant to report it when, as is true in many cases, the person who is
80. See supra notes 23–24.
81. See Child Welfare Information Gateway, Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect:
Summary of State Laws, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (Apr. 2010),
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/manda.cfm (“All States, the District of
Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands have statutes identifying persons who are required to report child maltreatment under specific
circumstances.”).
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victimizing them is a family member or family friend.82
Mandatory reporting by key sentries would help alleviate this underreporting problem, because it would give objective, experienced people
a duty to keep alert for, and report, elder financial abuse. Moreover, in
addition to discovering more elder financial abuse, thus making it more
likely to catch the perpetrators, mandatory reporting would also, in
many cases, result in elder financial abuse being caught much earlier. In
many cases this will allow the senior financial abuse to be detected
before a great deal of irrevocable financial damage is caused.
The most effective sentries would be those in professions who have
the most opportunity and ability to spot senior financial abuse. Two
types of professionals fit this description best: (1) medical professionals
who have the training and access to monitor seniors’ mental health (e.g.,
doctors, nurses, and home health aides); and (2) financial professionals
who have the training and access to monitor the financial health of
seniors (e.g., bank officials, brokers, and insurers). Luckily, there are
programs and laws in place that demonstrate how this mandatory
reporting could work.
An article published in the New York Times in March of 2011
described a nascent program that uses doctors as a line of defense
against senior financial fraud. Every doctor in the program receives a
short, four page laminated pocket guide that lists signs of potential
financial abuse, such as overly protective caregivers, changes in an
ability to take medications, cognitive problems, and being fearful,
distressed, or overly suspicious.83 The packet also lists the names and
websites for groups like the National Center on Elder Abuse and the
National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, as well as state securities
regulators—all of which the doctors can turn to for advice or to which
they can report their suspicions.84 This program has attracted support
from both NASAA and the National Adult Protective Services
Association (a group for social workers who handle abuse cases)—and
for good reason, as it shows signs of being highly effective.85 One
hundred and thirty doctors in Texas participated in the pilot program and
they found that 55% of their patients “displayed signs of financial
vulnerability and needed a follow-up by other professionals.”86 While
this does not mean that those 55% of patients were being victimized or

82. See Crary, supra note 30 (“A federally funded study conducted for the National Institute of
Justice in 2009 concluded that 5 percent of Americans 60 and older had been the victim of recent
financial exploitation by a family member, while 6.5 percent were the target of a nonfamily member.”).
83. Olson, supra note 13.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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in danger of being victimized, it does identify as them as being
potentially at risk for senior financial abuse—an incredibly valuable
piece of information that could give regulators and other seniorprotectors a head start in preventing senior financial abuse even before it
occurs.
In the first instance, this pilot program should be expanded to all
doctors—especially those doctors who specialize in treating seniors.
Moreover, there is no reason why nurses and home health aides should
not also be recruited to help. In a slide presentation, Dr. Robert E.
Roush and Dr. Aanand Naik explained in a number of simple steps how
a health professional can diagnose vulnerability to senior financial
abuse.87 Specifically, they put together a checklist of situations
associated with high risk—namely social isolation, bereavement,
dependence on another to provide care, being financially responsible for
another adult, child, or spouse, alcohol or drug abuse, depression, and
mental illness.88 They also provided examples of red flags from clinical
observations: changes in ability to perform activities of daily living,
including self-care, daily finances, and medication management; a sense
of being fearful or distressed; becoming suspicious or delusional; the
development of cognitive problems; being accompanied by an overly
protective caregiver who dominates the patient–client; and changes in
appearance, including poor hygiene.89 These are all signs that are easily
observable by members of the medical community and, because
members of the medical community are generally already mandatory
reporters of child abuse,90 they are already familiar with this type of
reporting responsibility. Considering the fact that most seniors must
regularly visit medical professionals, this makes health care providers
ideally suited to keep watch for signs of senior financial abuse.
Financial professionals like bank officials, brokers, and insurance
representatives are also particularly well-suited to detect senior financial
abuse for two reasons. First, they generally monitor the senior’s
financial assets. For instance, a bank official would notice if large
checks were suddenly being written to individuals, a broker would be
aware if a senior suddenly started liquidating stocks or bonds and
withdrawing money, and an insurance representative would know if a
senior wanted to change a beneficiary on a policy or take money out of a

87. ROBERT E. ROUSH & AANAND NAIK, PREVENTING ELDER INVESTMENT FRAUD: ASSESSING
VULNERABILITY
TO
FINANCIAL
EXPLOITATION,
available
at
http://www.americangeriatrics.org/files/documents/annual_meeting/2012/handouts/thursday/R07305305_Robert_E._Roush.pdf).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Child Welfare Information Gateway, supra note 81.
FOR
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policy’s cash value. This means that financial professionals would be
the first to see signs of senior financial abuse. Second, most people are
very reluctant to discuss their finances with anyone—financial
professionals are one of the few exceptions to this rule, so they are most
likely to have a sense of the senior’s financial history and to be
comfortable speaking with a senior about any changes they have
noticed. Together, these factors mean that financial professionals have a
very favorable vantage point from which to keep protective watch over
seniors’ finances.
As with the reporting by medical professionals described above, there
is also a model that can be adapted and should be adopted widely.
Specifically, California’s SB 1018, the Financial Abuse Reporting Act,
took effect on January 1, 2007.91 California’s Financial Abuse
Reporting Act requires employees of banks and credit unions who
suspect financial elder abuse to report their suspicions to adult protective
services or law enforcement. It also requires bank tellers to undergo
training to assist them in identifying elder abuse and navigating the
reporting process. The Financial Abuse Reporting Act can and should
be used as a model. It defines “suspected financial abuse” as when a
bank employee observes behavior or transactions that would lead a
person with similar training to form a reasonable belief that an elder is
the victim of financial abuse, and it gives legal protection to those bank
employees to report abuse.92 There are also enforcement mechanisms.
Under the Financial Abuse Reporting Act, employees have to report
suspected financial abuse by telephone immediately, or as soon as
possible, and file a written report within two working days with the local
adult protective services or law enforcement agency. Failure to report
an incident means that the bank is subject to a fine of up to $5,000.
This scheme, broadened to include the rest the country and other
financial professionals like brokers and insurance agents, would have an
enormously positive impact on preventing and stopping elder financial
abuse. After all, the objective of the perpetrators of elder financial
abuse is to take the financial assets of seniors. As the repository of
those financial assets, financial institutions can play a hugely beneficial
role in safeguarding them and preventing them from falling into the
wrong hands. This would also benefit the financial institutions
themselves as it would preserve these assets and keep them (and the fees
they generate) with the financial institutions and out of the hands of
fraudsters.
91. See BRIAN H. FANT, THE CIVIL LITIGATION RESPONSE TO FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION,
available at http://www.brianfantlaw.com/articles/FINANCIAL-EXPLOITATION.pdf.
STAT.
94
(2005–2006),
available
at
92. Id.
See
also
2005
CAL.
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_1001-1050/sb_1018_bill_20050829_chaptered.pdf.
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2. Treating Financial Professionals as Their Senior Customers’
Fiduciaries
As discussed above, apart from outright fraud and theft, one of the
biggest financial issues facing seniors is the sale of unsuitable financial
products to seniors. While the discussion above focused on the sale of
certain life insurance products like long-term deferred annuities, which
generate high commissions but are generally inappropriate for seniors,
there are doubtless numerous practices—like selling risky stocks to
those on fixed incomes, churning securities frequently to generating
commissions, or engaging in currency, derivatives, or options
speculation on behalf of a senior who do does understand the activity or
the risk—which are commonly engaged in, but are clearly inappropriate
for the senior client.
There are a couple of potential avenues that can be used to cut off this
problem or at least minimize its harm. One avenue would be to ban the
sale of certain financial products to seniors. This approach is
problematic, however, because it is simultaneously too broad and too
narrow. It is too broad because it restricts seniors from financial
products which may, in certain rare circumstances, be appropriate for
them. It also infantilizes competent seniors by taking away the ability to
choose certain financial products. If seniors on a fixed income want to
take crazy risks by option-trading, they should be able to do so—so long
as they are mentally competent and fully understand the risks. It is also
too narrow because there are countless amounts of financial products out
there, and more that are created every day. Banning one kind of
financial product for sale to seniors would likely result in the creation of
a slightly different product, with similar benefit to the broker or insurer.
This would result in similar deleterious effects on seniors that the
regulator or government has not had a chance to regulate yet. It is
nearly impossible for regulators to keep current with, much less ahead
of, financial product innovation. For both of these reasons, the ban of
specific products for sale to seniors would be, at best, suboptimal.
A better way to attack this problem is at its source. A major reason
these unscrupulous practices and those like them exist is a culture
among financial institutions that does not respect customers. For
instance, a recent New York Times editorial revealed that Goldman
Sachs employees commonly referred to their institutional clients as
“muppets.”93 One way to change that culture is to change the law.
Unlike directors and executives at public companies who owe a
93. Greg Smith, Why I Am Leaving Goldman Sachs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/opinion/why-i-am-leaving-goldmansachs.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all.
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fiduciary duty to their shareholders and companies, insurance agents and
brokers94 do not owe a fiduciary duty to their customers.95 This is true
even though all the characteristics of the relationship between a
customer and a broker or insurer—e.g., a relationship characterized by
asymmetric knowledge and expertise where the customer is relying on
the other party for advice—are typical of client relationships where a
fiduciary duty or its equivalent exists. Imposing a fiduciary relationship
on brokers or insurers would make them duty-bound to look after the
interests of their client. Thus, brokers or insurers would be prohibited
by their fiduciary duty from suggesting or pushing inappropriate
financial products on seniors.
This would be a much more flexible and effective solution than
banning specific financial products. It would not suffer from the
problem of being overly broad described above because it would allow
brokers/insurers to recommend whatever products work for a particular
senior’s goals and risk tolerances. Similarly, if a senior of sound mind
wanted to take risks that his or her broker/insurer recommended against,
he or she could do so. A fiduciary duty would not restrict the senior in
any way; it would simply insure that he or she were getting advice that
looked after their own interests.
A fiduciary duty would also avoid the narrowness problem described
above because it would cover all financial products and practices. In
other words, a broker/insurer would be tasked with analyzing each
product pitched to a senior and make sure that it made financial sense
for that senior, or that the broker/insurer would handle his affairs
similarly if in a comparable situation. This is something that people
likely assume brokers/insurers already do, but in fact they are not
required to by law. Establishing a fiduciary duty would fix that issue.
Enforcing and policing compliance with this fiduciary duty is
simple—customers could sue brokers or insurers if they believe they
breached their fiduciary duty to them. The law on fiduciary duty is
long-standing and courts are familiar with analyzing the issue. It should
be relatively simple to apply these long-standing common law principles
to a new profession—especially one which has the characteristics of

94. As required by Dodd–Frank, on Jan. 21, 2011 the SEC came out with the results of a study
and recommended that brokers be required to have the same fiduciary duty to their clients as investment
advisors. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER–DEALERS
(Jan. 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
This
recommendation has not been followed.
95. Most people are misinformed about this. See Alexis Leondis, ‘Clueless’ U.S. Investors
Believe Brokers Have Fiduciary Duty, Survey Says, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 15, 2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-15/-clueless-u-s-investors-believe-brokers-have-fiduciaryduty-survey-says.html (“Sixty percent of respondents said they thought insurance agents had to uphold a
fiduciary duty, which isn’t true.”).
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asymmetrical information and trust which usually accompany duties of
this sort.
A third, narrower approach, is to create a specific civil cause of action
for senior financial abuse. California is one state that has already gone
down this path. California’s Elder Abuse and Civil Protection Act
provides a specific cause of action for financial exploitation of any
resident sixty-five years or older or a person between the ages of
eighteen and sixty-four with diminished capacity96 “when a person
takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains or retains real or personal property
of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to
defraud or both.”97 California also imposes additional penalties in civil
cases where “senior citizens” or disabled persons are damaged by
“deceptive acts or practices or unfair methods of competition.”98
Specifically, plaintiffs can be awarded treble damages if “the defendant
knew or should have known that his or her conduct was directed to one
or more senior citizens or disabled persons.”99
California’s approach, while helpful, is limited. First, it would not
apply to the sale of inappropriate financial products to seniors, which is
an enormous problem. Second, many of the conducts targeted by the
California law are already common law torts (e.g., fraud, conversion,
etc.), meaning that the California law applies increased scrutiny and
penalties where the tort involves seniors, but does not make action that
is currently permissible (e.g., selling inappropriate financial products to
seniors) impermissible. It also does nothing to change the culture at
insurers and brokerage houses. For all these reasons, the second
approach, imposing a general fiduciary duty on brokers and insurers,
would be the most efficacious.
3. Requiring a License to Sell Products to Seniors
This third solution is meant to solve the problem of ignorance. As
discussed above, knowledge of seniors and their potentially special
needs is neither generally taught in school, nor is it part of a Series
Seven exam, a bar exam, or any other general professional licensing
requirement. This is foolish because, as discussed above, there are
numerous facts about seniors and tips about spotting senior financial
abuse which are easy to understand and apply. That is why there should
be a licensing exam to sell financial products or give financial advice to
seniors. If a broker or insurance salesman wants to ply his or her trade
96.
97.
98.
99.

See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.30–.65.
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.30.
FANT, supra note 91 (citing 2009 CAL. CIV. § 3345).
2009 CAL. CIV. § 3345(b)(1) (2012).
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among seniors, he or she should have to spend three to five hours
learning about seniors, senior financial abuse, and signs of cognitive
impairment, and pass a short test measuring what he or she learned. A
criminal background check would also be required. After passing the
test and the background check, a broker or insurance employee would be
issued a license that he or she would be entitled to display.
Additionally, brokers and insurance employees would be allowed to say
that they are certified on their business cards and in advertisements.
The requirement should not be particularly onerous, but even this
minimal knowledge will assist brokers and insurance salesmen in
understanding the needs of their senior customers and, perhaps as
importantly, make them much more effective reporters and legitimate
financial advisors. Just as everyone looks for board-certified physicians,
it would become an easily recognizable sign of legitimacy. Faking a
certification, of course, would be a crime.
IV. CONCLUSION
Senior financial abuse is a problem that does, or will, affect all of us.
We may be the victim, the victim could be a relative or a friend, or we
could simply just feel the effect, through higher taxes or fees at financial
institutions, of the billions of dollars lost to senior financial abuse every
year. Dodd–Frank recognizes that problem, but the solutions it offers,
while useful, are too small to stop or even retard the growth of a
problem of this magnitude. We need to do more; we need to transform
the relationship between financial service providers and their customers
from wary antagonism to trusted, well-trained protectors and guardians.
The three reforms suggested above should contribute significantly to
bring that about—and they also enlist the medical profession, a set of
trained eyes, to help see signs of trouble. It does not matter from where
these reforms emanate. They could come from the federal governments,
the states, or even perhaps the codes of conduct of professional
organizations, but they should be enacted.
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